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Strong stationary times and its use in
cryptography
Paweł Lorek, Filip Zagórski, and Michał Kulis
Abstract—This paper presents applicability of Strong Stationary Times (SST) techniques in the area of cryptography. The applicability
is in three areas:
1) Propositions of a new class of cryptographic algorithms (pseudo-random permutation generators) which do not run for the
predefined number of steps. Instead, these algorithms stop according to a stopping rule defined as SST, for which one can
obtain provable properties:
a) results are perfect samples from uniform distribution,
b) immunity to timing attacks (no information about the resulting permutation leaks through the information about the
number of steps SST algorithm performed).
2) We show how one can leverage properties of SST-based algorithms to construct an implementation (of a symmetric encryption
scheme) which is immune to the timing-attack by reusing implementations which are not secure against timing-attacks. In
symmetric key cryptography researchers mainly focus on constant time (re)implementations. Our approach goes in a different
direction and explores ideas of input masking.
3) Analysis of idealized (mathematical) models of existing cryptographic schemes – i.e., we improve a result by Mironov [21].
Index Terms—Pseudo-random permutation generator, Markov chains, mixing time, stream cipher, timing attacks
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
In the traditional cryptography primitives are treated as
mathematical objects, security definitions involve black-box
model: it is assumed that an adversary has only access to
inputs and outputs of a given cryptographic scheme. In
reality however, a device, or a particular implementation,
may expose lots of additional side-channel information, the
running time being one of the most important. It can be
particularly dangerous, since one can often measure the
time even without physical access to the device. Attacks
exploiting this are called timing attacks.
Algorithm 1 Simple modular exponentiation cd mod n
Require: c, d = dsds−1 · · · d1d0; di ∈ {0, 1}
1: x = 1
2: for i = s to 0 do
3: x = mod(x · x, n)
4: if di == 1 then
5: x = mod(x · c, n)
6: end if
7: end for
8: return x
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Straightforward implementations of RSA used the modu-
lar exponentiation algorithm as described in Algorithm 1
together with Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Modular division mod(x, n) = x mod n
Require: x, n
1: if x ≥ n then
2: x = x%n
3: end if
4: return x
An adversary, by careful selection of messages c, and just
by measuring the time it takes to compute the result is able
to completely recover d – the private key (since the number
of times line number 2 of the Algorithm 2 and line number
5 of the Algorithm 1 are called depends both on c and d).
Kocher [16] was the first one to discuss timing attacks.
How can one prevent timing attacks? There are two
natural approaches:
A1) Constant-time implementation. Re-implementing
the algorithm in such a way that the running time
is data independent (it runs in the same time on all
possible inputs).
A2) Masking (blinding). Use some extra randomness
in such a way that time-dependent operations are
performed on random inputs.
The A1 approach is self-explaining. However, not all al-
gorithms are easily transformable to constant time ones.
Moreover, the compiler in some cases can optimize the
algorithm resulting in data-dependent running time again,
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or a constant-time implementation on one platform may
become again time attack susceptible on a different platform
– see [23], [26].
In this paper we focus our attention on masking (i.e., A2)
by performing some “random” permutation first, which is
key-dependent.
Authors of [7] presented fast constant-time algorithms
for code-based public-key cryptography called McBits.
McBits uses a permutation network to achieve immunity
against cache-timing attacks. Permutation network is a net-
work built up of wires and comparators. Wires carry values
while comparators sort values between two wires (smaller
value goes to the upper wires, bigger value goes to the lower
wires). Permutation network is a fixed construction: number
of wires and comparators is fixed. When such a network has
the property that it sorts all inputs, then it is called a sorting
network.
In Section 5 of [7] on “Secret permutations” authors
write (where a permutation is considered as the output of a
permutation network)
“By definition a permutation network can reach
every permutation, but perhaps it is much more
likely to reach some permutations than others. Per-
haps this hurts security. Perhaps not [...]”
Above motivation leads to the following question:
How to obtain a key-based permutation which is
indistinguishable from a truly random one?
The doubt about the resulting permutation in [7] can come
from the following: one can have a recipe for constructing
a permutation involving some number of single steps, de-
termining however the necessary number of steps is not
trivial. In this paper we resolve the issue, our considera-
tions are Markov chain based. In particular, we consider
some card shuffling schemes. Our methods can have two
applications: we can determine number of steps so that
we are arbitrary close to uniform permutation; in so-called
SST version algorithm does not run pre-defined number of
steps, but instead it stops once randomness is reached. As
a side-effect we have a detailed analysis of some existing
stream ciphers. Many stream ciphers (e.g., RC4, RC4A [29],
RC4+ [30], VMPC [32], Spritz [28]) are composed of two
algorithms:
1) KSA (Key Scheduling Algorithm) uses a secret key
to transform identity permutation of n elements into
some other permutation.
2) PRGA (Pseudo Random Generation Algorithm)
starts with a permutation generated by KSA and
outputs random bits from it (some function of the
permutation and the current step number) while
updating the permutation at the same time.
KSAs of all aforementioned algorithms (RC4, RC4A,
Spritz, RC4+, VMPC) can be seen as performing some
card shuffling, where a secret key corresponds to/replaces
randomness. If we consider a version of the algorithm with
purely random secret key of infinite length, then we indeed
consider a card shuffling procedure. Following [21], we will
refer to such a version of the algorithm as an idealized
version. In the case of KSA used by RC4 the idealized
version (mathematical model) of the card shuffle is called
Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions shuffle.
The KSAs of mentioned ciphers perform shuffling for
some predefined number of steps. The security of such
a scheme is mainly based on analyzing idealized version
of the algorithm and corresponds to the “quality of a
shuffling”. Roughly speaking, shuffling is considered as a
Markov chain on permutations, all of them converge to
uniform distribution (perfectly shuffled cards). Then we
should perform as many steps as needed to be close to this
uniform distribution, what is directly related to the so-called
mixing time. This is one of the main drawbacks of RC4:
it performs Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions for n steps,
whereas the mixing time is of the order n logn.
There is a long list of papers which point out weaknesses
of the RC4 algorithm. Attacks exploited both weaknesses
of PRGA and KSA or the way RC4 was used in specific
systems [5], [13], [14], [15], [19]. As a result, in 2015 RC4
was prohibited in TLS by IETF, Microsoft and Mozilla.
In the paper we use so-called Strong Stationary Times
(SST) for Markov chains. The main area of application of
SSTs is studying the rate of convergence of a chain to its
stationary distribution. However, they may also be used for
perfect sampling from stationary distribution of a Markov
chain, consult [27] (on Coupling From The Past algorithm)
and [12] (on algorithms involving Strong Stationary Times
and Strong Stationary Duality).
This paper is an extension (and applications to timing
attacks) of [17] presented at Mycrypt 2016 conference.
1.1 Related work - timing attacks
Kocher [16] was first to observe that information about
the time it takes a given cryptographic implementation to
compute the result may leak information about the secret
(or private) key. Timing attack may be treated as the most
dangerous kind of side-channel attacks since it may be
exploited even by a remote adversary while most of other
types of side-channel attacks are distance bounded. Kocher
discussed presented timing attacks on RSA, DSS and on
symmetric key encryption schemes.
Similar timing attack was implemented for CASCADE
smart cards [10]. Authors report recovering 512-bit key after
350.000 timing measurements (few minutes in late 90s).
Later, Brumley and Boneh [8] showed that timing attacks
may be performed remotely and on algorithms that were
previously not considered vulnerable (RSA using Chinese
Remainder Theorem).
The usual way of dealing with timing attacks is to
attempt to re-implement a given scheme in such a way that
it runs the same number of steps (i.e., approach A1), no
matter what the input is. This approach has the following
drawbacks:
1) it requires to replace cryptographic hardware,
2) it is hard to do it right,
3) it badly influences the performance.
(1) The first limitation is quite obvious. So it may be
worth considering the idea of reusing a timing attack sus-
ceptible implementation by masking (see Section 1.1.1) its
inputs. This was the original timing attack countermeasure
technique proposed by Kocher for both RSA and DSS.
(2) An example of s2n – Amazon’s TLS implementation
and its rough road to become immune to timing attacks [2]
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shows that achieving timing resistance is not easy. It is not
an isolated case, it may be hard to achieve constant time in
the case of of implementation [24] but what may be more
worrying, even a change at the architecture level may not
lead to success [31].
(3) BearSSL is an implementation of TLS protocol which
consists of many constant time implementations (along with
a “traditional” ones) of the main cryptographic primitives.
Constant-time implementation of CBC encryption for AES is
5.89 times slower than the “standard” implementation [25].
On a reference platform it achieves the following perfor-
mance: AES-CBC (encryption, big): 161.40 MB/s while the
constant time (optimized for 64-bit architecture) has 27.39
MB/s. The slow-down is not always at the same rate, it
depends on both the function and on the mode of operation
used (for AES in CTR mode the slowdown is 1.86; for 3DES
it is 3.10).
1.1.1 Masking
Let F (·) be the RSA decryption (described as Algorithm 1)
implementation which uses a private key [d,N ] to decrypt
an encrypted message xe mod N . The following shows
how to design F which is immune to timing attacks but
reuses implementation of F . The approach proposed by
Kocher [16] is to run a bad implementation F on a random
input (same idea as Chaum’s blind-signatures [9]), the code
for F is presented in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 F – timing attack immune implementation of
RSA decryption using time-attack susceptible implementa-
tion F
Require: x, F, d, e,N
1: select r uniformly at random from Z∗N
2: compute y = F (d, xre mod N)
3: return s = yr−1 mod N
The security of this approach comes from the fact that
while the running time of G is not constant, an attacker
cannot deduce information about the key, because it does
not know the input to the F . This is because xre mod N is
a random number uniformly distributed in Z∗N .
The beauty of this approach lies in the fact that F is
actually run on a random input. After applying F one
can easily get rid of it. To be more precise: let g1(x, r) =
xre mod N and let g2(x, r) = xr
−1 mod N then G(d, x) =
g2(F (d, g1(x, r)), r) = F (d, x) (both g1 and g2 depend on
the public key [N, e]). Taking advantage of properties of
the underlying group lets us to remove the randomness r
(which remains secret to the attacker during the computa-
tions).
Similar approach can be applied to other public key
schemes e.g., RSA signatures, DSA signatures. It is unknown
how this approach – how to design G – may be applied to
symmetric-key cryptographic schemes without introducing
any changes to the original function F .
1.2 Our contribution
(1) Strong stationary time based PRNGs (Pseudo Random
Number Generators). Instead of running a PRNG algorithm
for some pre-defined number of steps, we make it random-
ized (Las Vegas algorithm). As far as we are aware the
idea of key-dependent running time in context of symmetric
ciphers was not considered earlier. To be more specific we
suggest utilization of so-called Strong Stationary Times
(SST) for Markov chains. We use SST to obtain samples
from uniform distribution on all permutations (we actually
perform perfect sampling). Few things needs pointing out:
1) In McBits [7] construction, authors perform similar
masking by performing some permutation. This
is achieved via a permutation network. However,
they: a) run it for a pre-defined number of steps
(they are unsure if the resulting permutation is
random); b) they work hard to make the implemen-
tation constant-time.
Utilization of SST allows to obtain a perfect sample
from uniform distribution (once SST rule is found,
we have it “for free”). This is a general concept
which may be applied to many algorithms.
2) Coupling methods are most commonly used tool
for studying the rate of convergence to stationarity
for Markov chains. They allow to bound the so-
called total variation distance between the distri-
bution of given chain at time instant k and its
stationary distribution. However, the (traditional)
security definitions require something “stronger”.
It turns out that bounding separation distance is
what one actually needs. It fits perfectly into the
notion of Strong Stationary Times we are using (see
Section 2.3).
3) By construction, the running time of our model is
key dependent. In extreme cases (very unlikely) it
may leak some information about the key, but it
does not leak any information about the resulting
permutation to an adversary. We elaborate more on
this in Section 6.5.
(2) Preventing timing attacks. We present a technique
which allows to obtain a timing attack immune implemen-
tation of a symmetric key encryption scheme by re-using
a timing attack vulnerable scheme. The technique follows
ideas of Kocher’s masking of the RSA algorithm and are
similar in nature to the utilization of a permutation network
in McBits.
The idea is that an input to a timing-attack vulnerable
function is first a subject to a pseudo-random permutation.
The permutation is generated (from a secret key) via SST-
based pseudo-random permutation generation algorithm.
The main properties of such an approach are following:
the resulting permutation is uniformly random provided the
long enough key is applied; the running time of an SST-
based algorithm does not reveal any information about the
resulting permutation.
Based on our straightforward implementation, we show
that the performance of our approach is similar to constant-
time implementations available in BearSSL [25], see Sec-
tion 7, Figure 7 (but does not require that much effort and
caution to implement it right).
(3) Analysis of idealized models of existing crypto-
graphic schemes.
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The approach, in principle, allows us to analyze the
quality of existing PRNGs, closing the gap between theo-
retical models and practice. The “only” thing which must
be done for a given scheme is to find an SST for the
corresponding shuffle and to analyze its properties. We
present in-depth analysis of RC4’s KSA algorithm. As a
result of Mironov’s [21] work, one knows that the idealized
version of RC4’s KSA would need keys of length ≈ 23 037
in order to meet the mathematical model. Similarly as in
[21], we propose SST which is valid for Cyclic-to-Random
Transpositions and Random-to-Random Transpositions . For
the latter one we calculate the mixing time which is “faster”.
It is known that Random-to-Random Transpositions card
shuffling needs 12n logn steps to mix. It is worth men-
tioning that this shuffling scheme and Cyclic-to-Random
Transpositions are similar in the spirit, it does not transfer
automatically that the latter one also needs 12n logn steps to
mix. Mironov [21] states that the expected time till reaching
uniform distribution is upper bounded by 2nHn − n, we
show that the expected running time for this SST applied to
Random-to-Random Transpositions is equal to
E[T ] = nHn + n+O(Hn)
(Hn is the n-th harmonic number) and empirically check
that the result is similar for Cyclic-to-Random Transposi-
tions . This directly translates into the required steps that
should be performed by RC4.
In fact one may use a better shuffling than the one that
is used in RC4, e.g., time-reversed riffle shuffle which requires
(on average) 4096 bits – not muchmore than 2048 bits which
are allowed for RC4 (see Section 5).
2 PRELIMINARY
Throughout the paper, let Sn denote a set of all permuta-
tions of a set {1, . . . , n} =: [n].
2.1 Markov chains and rate of convergence
Consider an ergodic Markov chain X = {Xk, k ≥ 0} on
a finite state space E = {0, . . . ,M − 1} with a stationary
distribution ψ. Let L(Xk) denote the distribution of the
chain at time instant k. By the rate of convergence we
understand the knowledge on how fast the distribution of
the chain converges to its stationary distribution. We have
to measure it according to some distance dist. Define
τdistmix(ε) = inf{k : dist(L(Xk), ψ) ≤ ε},
which is called mixing time (w.r.t. given distance dist). In
our case the state space is the set of all permutations of
[n], i.e., E := Sn. The stationary distribution is the uniform
distribution over E, i.e., ψ(σ) = 1n! for all σ ∈ E. In most
applications the mixing time is defined w.r.t. total variation
distance:
dTV (L(Xk), ψ) = 1
2
∑
σ∈Sn
∣∣∣∣Pr(Xk = σ) − 1n!
∣∣∣∣ .
The separation distance is defined by:
sep(L(Xk), ψ) := max
σ∈E
(1− n! · Pr(Xk = σ)) .
It is relatively easy to check that dTV (L(Xk), ψ) ≤
sep(L(Xk), ψ).
Strong Stationary Times. The definition of separation
distance fits perfectly into the notion of Strong Stationary
Times (SST) for Markov chains. This is a probabilistic tool for
studying the rate of convergence of Markov chains allowing
also perfect sampling. We can think of stopping time as of
a running time of an algorithm which observes a Markov
chain X and which stops according to some stopping rule
(depending only on the past).
Definition 2.1. Random variable T is a randomized stop-
ping time if it is a running time of the RANDOMIZED
STOPPING TIME algorithm.
Algorithm 4 RANDOMIZED STOPPING TIME
1: k := 0
2: coin :=Tail
3: while coin ==Tail do
4: At time k, (X0, . . . , Xk) was observed
5: Calculate fk(X), where fk : (X0, . . . , Xk)→ [0, 1]
6: Let p = fk(X0, . . . , Xk). Flip the coin resulting in
Head with probability p and in Tail with probability
1− p. Save result as coin.
7: k := k + 1
8: end while
Definition 2.2. Random variable T is a Strong Stationary
Time (SST) if it is a randomized stopping time for chain
X such that:
∀(i ∈ E) Pr(Xk = i|T = k) = ψ(i).
Having SST T lets us bound the following (see [4])
sep(L(Xk), ψ) ≤ Pr(T > k). (1)
2.2 Distinguishers and security definition
In this section we define a Permutation distinguisher –
we consider its advantage in a traditional cryptographic
security definition. That is, a Permutation distinguisher is
given a permutation π and needs to decide whether π is
a result of a given (pseudo-random) algorithm or if π is
a permutation selected uniformly at random from the set
of all permutations of a given size. The upper bound on
Permutation distinguisher’s advantage is an upper bound
on any possible distinguisher – even those which are not
bounded computationally. Additionally, in the Section 4.1
we consider Sign distinguisher.
Permutation distinguisher The distinguishability game
for the adversary is as follows (Algorithm 5):
Definition 2.3. The permutation indistinguishability
ShuffleS,A(n, r) experiment:
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Algorithm 5 ShuffleS,A(n, r)
Let S be a shuffling algorithm which in each round requires
m bits, and let A be an adversary.
1) S is initialized with:
a) a key generated uniformly at random K ∼
U({0, 1}rm),
b) S0 = π0 (identity permutation)
2) S is run for r rounds: Sr := S(K) and produces a
permutation πr .
3) We set:
• c0 := πrand a random permutation from
uniform distribution is chosen,
• c1 := πr.
4) A challenge bit b ∈ {0, 1} is chosen at random,
permutation cb is sent to the Adversary.
5) Adversary replies with b′.
6) The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if
b′ = b, and 0 otherwise.
In the case when the adversary wins the game (if b = b′) we
say thatA succeeded. The adversary wins the game if it can
distinguish the random permutation from the permutation
being a result of the PRPG algorithm.
Definition 2.4. A shuffling algorithm S generates indistin-
guishable permutations if for all adversaries A there
exists a negligible function negl such that
Pr [ShuffleS,A(n, r) = 1] ≤ 1
2
+ negl(n).
The above translates into:
Definition 2.5. A shuffling algorithm S generates indistin-
guishable permutations if for any adversary A there
exists a negligible function negl such that:
∣∣∣∣ Pr
K←{0,1}keyLen
[A(S(K)) = 1]− Pr
R←U(Sn)
[A(R) = 1]
∣∣∣∣
≤ negl(n).
2.3 Strong stationary times and security guarantees
Coupling method is a commonly used tool for bounding the
rate of convergence of Markov chains. Roughly speaking, a
coupling of a Markov chain X with a transition matrix P is
a bivariate chain (X′,X′′) such that marginally X′ and X′′
are Markov chains with the transition matrix P and once
the chains meet they stay together (in some definitions this
condition can be relaxed). Let then Tc = infk{X ′k = X ′′k }
i.e., the first time chains meet, called coupling time. The cou-
pling inequality states that dTV (L(Xk), ψ) ≤ Pr(Tc > k).
On the other hand, separation distance is an upper
bound on total variation distance, i.e., dTV (L(Xk), ψ) ≤
sep(L(Xk), ψ). At first glance it seems that it is better to
directly bound dTV , since we can have dTV very small,
whereas sep is (still) large. However, knowing that sep is
small gives us much more than just knowing that dTV is
small, what turns out to be crucial for proving security
guarantees (i.e., Definition 2.5). In our case (E = Sn and
ψ is a uniform distribution on E) having dTV small, i.e.,
dTV (L(Xk), ψ) = 12
∑
σ∈Sn
∣∣Pr(Xk = σ)− 1n! ∣∣ ≤ ε does
not imply that |Pr(Xk = σ) − 1n! | is uniformly small (i.e.,
of order 1n! ). Knowing however that sep(L(Xk), ψ) ≤ ε
implies
∀(σ ∈ E)
∣∣∣∣Pr(Xk = σ)− 1n!
∣∣∣∣ ≤ εn! . (2)
Above inequality is what we need in our security definitions
and shows that the notion of separation distance is an
adequate measure of mixing time for our applications.
It is worth noting that dTV (L(Xk),U(E)) ≤ ε implies
(see Theorem 7 in [3]) that sep(L(X2k),U(E)) ≤ ε. This
means that proof of security which bounds directly total
variation distance by ε would require twice as many bits
of randomness compared to the result which guarantees ε
bound on the separation distance.
3 SHUFFLING CARDS
In this Section we consider four chains
X
(T2R),X(RTRT ),X(CTRT ),X(RS) corresponding to
known shuffling schemes: Top-To-Random, Random-To-
Random Transpositions, Cyclic-To-Random Transpositions
and Riffle Shuffle (we actually consider its time reversal).
The state space of all chains is E = Sn. The generic state
is denoted by S ∈ E, where S[j] denotes the position of
element j. Rough description of one step of each shuffling
(in each shuffling “random” corresponds to the uniform
distribution) is following:
• X(T2R): choose random position j and move the
card S[1] (i.e., which is currently on top) to this
position.
• X(RTRT ): choose two positions i and j at random
and swap cards S[i] and S[j].
• X(CTRT ): at step t choose random position j and
swap cards S[(t mod n) + 1] and S[j].
• X(RS): assign each card random bit. Put all cards
with bit assigned 0 to the top keeping relative posi-
tions of these cards.
The stationary distribution of all the chains is uniform, i.e.
ψ(σ) = 1n! for all σ ∈ E. Aforementioned Strong Stationary
Time is one of the methods to study rate of convergence.
Probably the simplest (in description) is an SST for X(T2R):
Wait until the card which is initially at the bottom
reaches the top, then make one step more.
Denote this time by T (T2R). In this classical example T (T2R)
corresponds to the classical coupon collector problem. We
know that Pr(T (T2R) > n logn+cn) ≤ e−c, thus via (1) we
have
dTV (L(X(T2R)k ), ψ) ≤ sep(L(X(T2R)k ), ψ) ≤ e−c
for k = n logn+ cn. This bound is actually tight, in a sense
that there is a so-called cutoff at n logn, see Aldous and
Diaconis [3].
The chainX(RTRT ) mixes at 12n logn, the result was first
proven by Diaconis and Shahshahani [11] with analytical
methods, Matthews [20] provided construction of SST for
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There is a simple construction of SST for X(RS): initially
consider all pairs of cards as unmarked. Then, if at some
step cards in some pair were assigned different bits mark
this pair. Stop at the first time when all pairs are marked.
This SST yields in 2n log2 n mixing time (the actual answer
is that (3/2)n log2 n steps are enough).
The case X(CTRT ) is a little bit more complicated. Hav-
ing SST T does not automatically imply that we are able
to bound Pr(T > k), or even calculate ET . This is due
to the cyclic structure of the shuffle. Note that “in spirit”
X
(CTRT ) is similar to X(RTRT ), which - as mentioned -
mixes at 12n logn (and even more - there is a so-called cutoff
at this value, meaning that “most of the action happens”
around 12n logn). Mironov [21] (in context of analysis of
RC4) showed that it takes O(n log n) for this shuffle to mix.
Unfortunately Mironov’s “estimate of the rate of growth of
the strong stationary time T is quite loose” and results “are
a far cry both from the provable upper and lower bounds
on the convergence rate”. He:
• proved an upper bound O(n log n). More precisely
Mironov showed that there exists some positive
constant c such that P [T > cn logn] → 0 when
n→ ∞. Author experimentally checked that P [T >
2n lgn] < 1/n for n = 256 which corresponds to
P [T > 4096] < 1/256.
• experimentally showed that E[T ] ≈ 11.16n ≈
1.4n lgn ≈ 2857 (for n = 256) – which translates
into: on average one needs to drop ≈ 2601 initial
bytes.
Later Mosel, Peres and Sinclair [22] proved a matching
lower bound establishing mixing time to be of order
Θ(n logn). However, the constant was not determined.
One can apply the following approach: find T which is
a proper SST for both X(CTRT ) and X(RTRT ), calculate its
expectation for X(RTRT ) and show experimentally that the
expectation is similar for X(CTRT ). This is the main part of
this Section resulting in a conjecture that the mixing time of
X
(CTRT ) is n logn.
3.1 Mironov’s SST for Cyclic-to-Random Transposi-
tions
Let us recall Mironov’s [21] construction of SST:
“At the beginning all cards numbered
0, . . . , n − 2 are unchecked, the (n − 1)th card
is checked. Whenever the shuffling algorithm
exchanges two cards, S[i] and S[j], one of the two
rules may apply before the swap takes place:
a. If S[i] is unchecked and i = j, check S[i].
b. If S[i] is unchecked and S[j] is checked,
check S[i].
The event T happens when all cards become
checked. ”
Then the author proves that this is a SST for Cyclic-to-
Random Transpositions and shows that there exists constant
c (can be chosen less than 30) such that Pr[T > cn logn]→
0 when n→∞. Note that this marking scheme is also valid
for Random-to-Random Transpositions shuffling, for which
we have:
Lemma 1. The expected running time of Random-to-
Random Transpositions shuffling with Mironov stop-
ping rule is:
ET = 2nHn − n+O(Hn).
Proof. We start with one card checked. When k cards are
checked, then probability of checking another one is equal
to pk =
(n−k)(k+1)
n2 . Thus, the time to check all the cards is
distributed as a sum of geometric random variables and its
expectation is equal to:
n−1∑
k=1
1
pk
= 2
n2
n+ 1
Hn − n = 2nHn − n+O(Hn).

3.2 Better SST for Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions
We suggest another “faster” SST which is valid for both
Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions and Random-to-Random
Transpositions . We will calculate its expectation and vari-
ance for Random-to-Random Transpositions and check ex-
perimentally that it is similar if the stopping rule is applied
to Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions . The SST is given in
StoppingRuleKLZ algorithm.
Algorithm 6 StoppingRuleKLZ
Input set of already marked cards M ⊆ {1, . . . , n},
round r, Bits
Output {YES,NO}
j =n-value(Bits)
if there are less than ⌈(n− 1)/2⌉marked cards then
if both π[r] and π[j] are unmarked then
mark card π[r]
end if
else
if (π[r] is unmarked and π[j] is marked) OR (π[r] is
unmarked and r = j) then
mark card π[r]
end if
end if
if all cards are marked then
STOP
else
CONTINUE
end if
Lemma 2. The stopping rule StoppingRuleKLZ is SST for
X
(CTRT ).
Proof. First phase of the procedure (i.e., the case when there
are less than ⌈(n − 1)/2⌉ cards marked) is a construction a
random permutation of marked cards by placing unmarked
cards on randomly chosen unoccupied positions – this is
actually the first part of Matthews’s [20] marking scheme.
Second phase is simply a Broder’s construction. Theorem 9.
in [21] shows that this is a valid SST for Cyclic-to-Random
Transpositions . Both phases combined produce a random
permutation of all cards. 
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Remark 1. One important remark should be pointed. Full
Matthews’s marking [20] scheme is an SST which is
“faster” than ours. However, although it is valid for
Random-to-Random Transpositions , it is not valid for
Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions .
CalculatingET or V arT seems to be a challenging task. But
note that marking scheme StoppingRuleKLZ also yields a
valid SST for Random-to-Random Transpositions . In next
Lemma we calculate ET and V arT for this shuffle, later
we experimentally show that ET is very similar for both
marking schemes.
Lemma 3. Let T be the SST StoppingRuleKLZ applied to
Random-to-Random Transpositions . Then we have
E[T ] = nHn + n+O(Hn),
V ar[T ] ∼ pi24 n2,
(3)
where f(k) ∼ g(k) means that limk→∞ f(k)g(k) = 1.
Proof. Define Tk to be the first time when k cards are
marked (thus T ≡ Tn). Let d = ⌈(n − 1)/2⌉. Then Td is the
running time of the first phase and (Tn − Td) is the running
time of the second phase. Denote Yk := Tk+1 − Tk.
Assume that there are k < d marked cards at a certain
step. Then the new card will be marked in next step if we
choose two unmarked cards what happens with probability:
pa(k) =
(n− k)2
n2
.
Thus Yk is a geometric random variable with parameter
pa(k) and
E[Td] =
=
d−1∑
k=0
E[Yk] =
d−1∑
k=0
1
pa(k)
=
d−1∑
k=0
n2
(n− k)2 = n
2
n∑
k=n−d+1
1
k2
= n2
(
H(2)n −H(2)n−d
)
= n2
(
1
n
+O
(
1
n2
))
= n+O(1).
Now assume that there are k ≥ d cards marked at a certain
step. Then, the new card will be marked in next step with
probability:
pb(k) =
(n− k)(k + 1)
n2
and Yk is a geometric random variable with parameter
pa(k). Thus:
E[Tn − Td]
=
∑d−1
k=0E[Yk] =
∑n−1
k=d
1
pb(k)
=
∑n−1
k=d
n2
(n−k)(k+1)
= n
2
n+1
∑n−1
k=d
(
1
n−k +
1
k+1
)
= n
2
n+1
(∑n−d
k=1
1
k +
∑n
k=d+1
1
k
)
= n
2
n+1 (Hn−d +Hn −Hd) = n
2
n+1Hn +
n2
n+1 (Hn−d −Hd)
= nHn − nn+1Hn + n
2
n+1 (Hn−d −Hd)
= nHn +O(Hn) +O(1) = nHn +O(Hn).
For variance we have:
V ar[Td] =
d−1∑
k=0
1− pa(k)
(pa(k))
2 =
d−1∑
k=0
1− (n−k)2n2(
(n−k)2
n2
)2 ≈
∫ n
2
0
1− (n−x)2n2(
(n−x)2
n2
)2 dx = 43n.
V ar[Tn − Td] =
n−1∑
k=d
V ar[Yk] =
n−1∑
k=d
1− pb(k)
(pb(k))
2 =
n−1∑
k=d
1− (n−k)(k+1)n2
(n−k)2(k+1)2
n4
= n2
n−1∑
k=d
n(n− 1) + k(1− n) + k2
(n− k)2(k + 1)2
≈ n2 · 1
2
n−1∑
k=0
n(n− 1) + k(1− n) + k2
(n− k)2(k + 1)2
≈ n
2
2
[(
2
n
− 4
n2
)
Hn + 3H
(2)
n
]
∼ π
2
4
n2.
Finally,
V ar[Tn] = V ar[Td] + V ar[Tn − Td] ∼ π
2
4
n2.

3.3 Experimental results
The expectation of the following SSTs applied to Random-
to-Random Transpositions shuffling scheme is known:
• Mironov’s SST (used in [21]) it is 2nHn − n
• StoppingRuleKLZ SST it is n(Hn + 1)
As shown, both marking schemes are valid for both, Cyclic-
to-Random Transpositions and Random-to-Random Trans-
positions shufflings. For both stopping rules applied to
Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions no precise results on ex-
pected running times are known. Insteadwe estimated them
via simulations, simply running 10.000 of them. The results
are given in Fig. 1.
StoppingRuleKLZ Mironov’s ST
ET
n = 256 1811 2854
n = 512 3994 6442
n = 1024 8705 14324
V arT
n = 256 111341 156814
n = 512 438576 597783
n = 1024 1759162 2442503
n(Hn + 1) 2nHn − n
n = 256 1823.83 2879.66
n = 512 4002.05 6468.11
n = 1024 8713.39 14354.79
Fig. 1. Simulations’ results for Mironov’s and StoppingRuleKLZ stop-
ping rules.
The conclusion is that they do not differ much. This
suggest following:
Conjecture 1. The mixing time τsepmix for Cyclic-to-Random
Transpositions converges to n logn as n→∞.
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3.4 Optimal shuffling
Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions is the shuffle used in RC4
and in Spritz. To reach stationarity (i.e., produce random
permutation), as we have shown, one needs to perform
O(n log n) steps. In each step we use a random number
from interval [0, . . . , n − 1], thus this shuffling requires
O(n log2 n) random bits.
One can ask the following question: Is this shuffling optimal
in terms of required bits? The answer is no. The entropy of
the uniform distribution on [n] is O(n log n) (since there are
n! permutations of [n]), thus one could expect that optimal
shuffling would require this number of bits. Applying de-
scribed Riffle Shuffle yields SST with ET = 2 lgn, at each
step n random bits are used, thus this shuffling requires
2n lgn random bits, matching the requirement of optimal
shuffle (up to a constant).
In Figure 2 we summarized required number of bits for
various algorithms and stopping rules.
# bits RC4 Mironov KSAKLZ RS
used 40− 2048
asympt. (2nHn − 1) lgn n(Hn + 1) lgn 2n lgn
required 23 037 14 590 4 096
Fig. 2. Comparison between number of bits used by RC4 (40 to
2048) and required by mathematical models (Mironov [21] and ours –
KSAKLZ ) versus length of the key for the time-reversed riffle shuffle.
Bits asymptotics approximates the number of fresh bits required by the
mathematical model (number of bits required by the underlying Markov
chain to converge to stationary distribution). Bits required is (rounded)
value of # bits asymptotics when n = 256.
3.5 Perfect shuffle
Let X be an ergodic chain with a stationary distribution ψ.
Ergodicity means that nevertheless of initial distribution, the
distribution L(Xk) converges, in some sense, to ψ as k →∞
(it is enough to think of dTV (L(Xk), ψ) converging to 0 as
k → ∞). Beside some trivial situations, the distribution of
L(Xk) is never equal to ψ for any finite k. That is why
we need to study mixing time to know how close L(Xk)
to ψ is. However, there are methods for so-called perfect
simulations. This term refers to the art of converting a
Markov chain into the algorithm which (if stops) returns
exact (unbiased) sample from stationary distribution of the
chain. The most famous one is the Coupling From The Past
(CFTP) algorithm introduced in [27]. The ingenious idea is
to realize the chain as evolving from the past. However,
to apply algorithm effectively the chain must be so-called
realizablemonotone, which is defined w.r.t some underlying
partial ordering. Since we consider random walk on permu-
tations, applying CFTP seems to be a challenging task.
However, having Strong Stationary Time rule we can
actually perform perfect simulation(!). We simply run the
chain until event SST occurs. At this time, the Definition 2.2
implies, that the distribution of the chain is stationary.
It is worth mentioning that all SSTs mentioned at the
beginning of this Section are deterministic (i.e., they are
deterministic functions of the path of the chain, they do not
use any extra randomness - it is not the case for general SST).
For a method for perfect simulation based on SST (and other
methods) see [18], where mainly monotonicity requirements
for three perfect sampling algorithms are considered.
4 (NOT SO) RANDOM SHUFFLES OF RC4 – REVIS-
ITED
RC4 algorithm. RC4 is a stream cipher, its so-called internal
state is (S, i, j), where S is a permutation of [n] and i, j
are some two indices. As input it takes L−byte message
m1, . . . ,mL and a secret key K and returns ciphertext
c1, . . . , cL. The initial state is the output of KSA. Based on
this state PRGA is used to output bits which are XORed
with the message. The actual KSA algorithm used in RC4
is presented in Figure 3 together with its idealized version
KSA∗ (where a secret key-based randomness is replaced
with pure randomness)
KSA KSA∗
for i := 0 to n− 1 do
S[i] := i
end for
j := 0
for i := 0 to n− 1 do
j := j+S[i]+K[i mod l]
swap(S[i], S[j])
end for
i, j := 0
for i := 0 to n− 1 do
S[i] := i
end for
for i := 0 to n− 1 do
j :=random(n)
swap(S[i], S[j])
end for
i, j := 0
Fig. 3. KSA of RC4 algorithm and its idealized version KSA∗.
The goal of KSA of original RC4 is to produce a pseu-
dorandom permutation of n = 256 cards. The original
algorithm performs 256 steps of Cyclic-to-Random Trans-
positions . Even if we replace j := j + S[i] + K[i mod l]
in KSA with j = random(n) (i.e., we actually consider
idealized version), then Θ(n logn) steps are needed. Con-
sidering idealized version was a main idea of Mironov
[21]. Moreover, he showed that 2n logn steps are enough.
However, our result stated in Lemma 3 together with
experimental results from Section 3.3 imply that around
n logn steps are enough. Moreover, if we consider KSA
with Random-to-Random Transpositions (instead of Cyclic-
to-Random Transpositions) then we can state more formal
theorem in terms of introduced security definitions.
Theorem 1. Let A be an adversary. Let K ∈ {0, 1}rn be a
secret key. Let S(K) be KSA with Random-to-Random
Transpositions shuffling which runs for
r = n(Hn + 1) +
πn
2
1√
n!ε
steps with 0 < ε < 1n! . Then∣∣∣∣ Pr
K←{0,1}rm
[A(S(K)) = 1]− Pr
R←U(Sn)
[A(R) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
Proof. The stopping rule StoppingRuleKLZ given in Sec-
tion 3.2 is an SST for Random-to-Random Transpositions ,
denote it by T . From Lemma 3 we know that ET =
n(Hn + 1) + O(Hn) and V arT ∼ pi24 n2. Inequality (1) and
Chebyshev’s inequality imply that for r = n(Hn +1)+
pin
2 c
we have
sep(L(Xr), ψ) ≤ P (T > r) ≤ 1
c2
,
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i.e., r = τsepmix(c
−2). Taking c = 1√
n!ε
we perform Random-
to-Random Transpositions for r = τsepmix(n!ε) steps, i.e.,
sep(L(Xr), ψ) ≤ n!ε Inequality (2) implies that |Pr(Xr =
σ) − 1n! | ≤ ε for any permutation σ and thus completes the
proof. 
4.1 Sign distinguisher for or Cyclic-to-Random Trans-
positions.
Sign distinguisher. For a permutation π which has
a representation of non-trivial transpositions π =
(a1b1)(a2b2) . . . (ambm) the sign is defined as: sign(π) =
(−1)m. So the value of the sign is +1 whenever m is even
and is equal to −1 whenever m is odd. The distinguisher is
presented in Figure 4.
Fig. 4. Sign distinguisher for Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions
Input: S, t
Output: b
if sign(S)=(−1)t
then return false
else return true
It was observed in [21] that the sign of the permutation
at the end of RC4’s KSA algorithm is not uniform. And as
a conclusion it was noticed that the number of discarded
shuffles (by PRGA) must grow at least linearly in n. Below
we present this result obtained in a different way than
in [21], giving the exact formula for advantage at any step t.
One can look at the sign-change process for the Cyclic-to-
Random Transpositions as follows: after the table is initial-
ized, sign of the permutation is +1 since it is identity so the
initial distribution is concentrated in v0 = (Pr(sign(Z0) =
+1), P r(sign(Z0) = −1)) = (1, 0).
Then in each step the sign is unchanged if and only if
i = j which happens with probability 1/n. So the transition
matrixMn of a sign-change process induced by the shuffling
process is equal to:
Mn :=
(
1
n 1− 1n
1− 1n 1n
)
.
This conclusion corresponds to looking at the distribution of
the sign-change process after t steps: v0 ·M tn, where v0 is the
initial distribution. The eigenvalues and eigenvectors ofMn
are (1, 2−nn ) and (1, 1)
T , (−1, 1)T respectively. The spectral
decomposition yields
v0 ·Mtn = (1, 0)

 1 −1
1 1



 1 0
0 2−n
n


t

1
2 − 12
− 12 12


=
(
1
2
+
1
2
(
2
n
− 1
)t
,
1
2
− 1
2
(
2
n
− 1
)t)
.
In Fig. 5 the advantage ǫ of a sign-adversary after dropping
k bytes of the output (so after n+ k steps of the shuffle, for
the mathematical model) is presented.
k +1 −1 ǫ
0 .5671382998250798 .4328617001749202 2−3.89672
256 .509015 .490985 2−6.79344
512 .5012105173235390 .4987894826764610 2−9.69016
768 .500163 .499837 2−12.5869
1024 .5000218258757580 .4999781741242420 2−15.4836
2048 .5000000070953368 .4999999929046632 2−27.0705
4096 .5000000000000007 .4999999999999993 2−50.2442
8192 .5 .5 2−96.5918
Fig. 5. The advantage (ǫ) of the Sign distinguisher of RC4 after n + k
steps or equivalently, after discarding initial k bytes.
For n = 256 (which corresponds to the value of n
used in RC4) and initial distribution being identity per-
mutation after t = n = 256 steps one gets: v0 · M256256 =
(0.567138, 0.432862).
In [19] it was suggested that the first 512 bytes of the
output should be dropped.
5 STRONG STATIONARY TIME BASED KSA ALGO-
RITHMS
In addition to KSA and KSA∗ (given in Fig. 3) we introduce
another version called KSA∗∗Shuffle,ST(n). The main differ-
ence is that it does not run a predefined number of steps,
but it takes some procedure ST as a parameter (as well
as Shuffle procedure). The idea is that it must be a rule
corresponding to Strong Stationary Time for given shuffling
scheme. The KSA∗∗Shuffle,ST(n) is given in the following
algorithm:
Algorithm 7 KSA∗∗Shuffle,ST(n)
Require: Card shuffling Shuffle procedure, stopping rule
ST which is a Strong Stationary Time for Shuffle.
for i := 0 to n− 1 do
S[i] := i
end for
while (¬ ST) do
Shuffle(S)
end while
The algorithm works as follows. It starts with identity
permutation. Then at each step it performs some card shuf-
fling procedure Shuffle. Instead of running it for a pre-
defined number of steps, it runs until an event defined by a
procedure ST occurs. The procedure ST is designed in such
a way that it guarantees that the event is a Strong Stationary
Time. At each step the algorithm uses new randomness –
one can think about that as of an idealized version but
when the length of a key is greater than the number of
random bits required by the algorithm then we end up with
a permutation which cannot be distinguished from a ran-
dom (uniform) one (even by a computationally unbounded
adversary).
Notational convention: in KSA∗∗Shuffle,ST(n) we omit param-
eter n. Moreover, if Shuffle and ST are omitted it means
that we use Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions as shuffling
procedure and stopping rule is clear from the context. Note
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that if we use for stopping rule ST “stop after n steps”
(which of course is not SST), it is equivalent to RC4’s KSA∗.
Given a shuffling procedure Shuffle one wants to
have a “fast” stopping rule ST (perfectly one wants an
optimal SST which is stochastically the smallest). The stop-
ping rule ST is a parameter, since for a given shuffling
scheme one can come up with a better stopping rule(s).
This is exactly the case with Cyclic-to-Random Transposi-
tions and Random-to-Random Transpositions . In Section 3
we recalled Mironov’s [21] stopping rule as well as new
introduced “faster” rule called (called StoppingRuleKLZ).
Let us point out few important properties of
KSA∗∗Shuffle,ST(n) algorithm:
P1 The resulting permutation is purely random.
P2 The information about the number of rounds that an
SST-algorithm performs does not reveal any infor-
mation about the resulting permutation.
The property P1 is due to the fact that we actually perform
perfect simulation (see Section 3.5). The property P2 follows
from the fact that the Definition 5.1 is equivalent to the
following one (see [4]):
Definition 5.1. Random variable T is Strong Stationary
Time (SST) if it is a randomized stopping time for chain
X such that:
XT has distribution ψ and is independent of T.
The property P1 is the desired property of the output of
the KSA algorithm, whereas P2 turns out to be crucial for
our timing attacks applications (details in Section 6).
6 TIMING ATTACKS AND SST
In the black box model (for CPA-security experiment), an
adversary has access to an oracle computing encryptions
F (k, ·) for a secret key k. So the adversary is allowed to
obtain a vector of cryptograms (c1, . . . , cq) for plaintexts
(m1, . . . ,mq) of its choice (where each ci = 〈ri, yi〉 =
F (k,mi, ri)). Each ri is the randomness used by the oracle
to compute encryption (e.g., its initial counter ctr for CTR-
mode, IV for CBC-mode etc.). So the adversary has a vector
of tuples
OBlackBox,F = 〈mi, ci〉 = 〈mi, F (k,mi, ri)〉 .
In the real world, as a result of interacting with an
implementation of F , a timing information may also be
accessible to an adversary. In such a case her knowledge
is a vector of tuples
OTiming,F = 〈mi, ci, ti〉 = 〈mi, F (k,mi, ri), ti〉 ,
where ti is the time to reply with ci on query mi and ran-
domness used ri. (A very similar information is accessible
to an adversary in chosen-ciphertext attacks.)
An encryption scheme is susceptible to a timing attack
when there exists an efficient function H which on input
H (〈m1, c1, t1〉 , . . . , 〈mw, cw, tw〉) outputs λ(k) (some func-
tion of a secret key k). Depending on the scheme and on
a particular implementation the leakage function can be of
various forms e.g., λ(k) = HW (k) – the Hamming weight
of k, or in the best case λ(k) = k.
The reason why a timing attack on implementation of a
function F (y = F (k, x)) is possible is because the running
time of F is not the same on each input. Usually timing
attacks focus on a particular part of F – fweak which
operates on a function hx of the original input x and on
a function hk of the original key (e.g., hk may be a substring
of a round key). When F (k, x) = frest(k, fweak(k, x)) the
statistical model is built and T (F (k, x)) = T (fweak(k, x)) +
T (frest(k, fweak(k, x))). The distribution of T (fweak(k, x))
is conditioned on k and estimating this value (conditioned
on subset of bits of k) is the goal of the adversary.
6.1 Countermeasures – approach I
There is one common approach to eliminate possibility of
timing attacks, namely to re-implement F (ct(F ) = Fct
– constant-time implementation of F ) in such a way that
for all pairs (k, x) 6= (k′, x′) the running times are the
same T (F (k, x)) = T (F (k′, x′)) = t. Then, an adversary’s
observation:
OTiming,ct(F ) = 〈mi, ci, t〉 = 〈mi, Fct(k,mi, ri), t〉
becomes the same as in the black-box model.
6.2 Countermeasures – approach II
The other approach is to still use a weak implementa-
tion, but “blind” (mask) the adversary’s view. Let us start
with a public-key example, described in the Section 1.1.1.
The RSA’s fragile decryption F (d, c) = fweak(d, c) (Algo-
rithm 1) is implemented with masking (Algorithm 8) as:
Fmasked(d, c) = g2(fweak(d, g1(c, r)), r), where g1(c, r) =
cre mod N and g2(x, r) = xr
−1 mod N . In this case, the
adversary’s view is:
OTiming,masked(F ) = 〈ci, Fmasked(d, ci), ti〉 .
While ti are again different, they depend on both d and
g1(ci, ri), but an adversary does not obtain information
about random ri’s and thous information about ti is useless.
6.3 Non-constant time implementation immune to tim-
ing attacks for symmetric encryption
Let us use the similar approach for the symmetric encryp-
tion case. For a time-attack susceptible function F we would
like to build a function G by designing functions g1(·) and
g2(·) and then to define
G(k, x) = g2(F (k, g1(x, ·)), ·).
We restrict ourselves only to functionsG of that form. We do
not require thatG(k, x) = F (k, x) as it was in the public key
case. It would be enough for us that there exists an efficient
algorithm for decryption – this is satisfied if both g1, g2 have
efficiently computable inversions.
Now let us consider the following approaches for select-
ing g1 (and g2):
1) g1(x) – then such an approach is trivially broken
because an attacker knows exactly what is the input
to F .
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2) g1(x, r) for a randomly selected r generated during
run of G. Assuming that r cannot be efficiently
removed from F (k, g1(x, r)) via application of g2,
the ciphertext ofGwould need to include r but then
this is exactly the same case as (1).
3) g1(k, x) – in that case an attacker might want to
perform a timing attack on g1 – one would need to
guarantee that g1 itself is immune to timing attacks.
This approach is used in McBits [7] system, g1 is a
constant-time implementation of Beneš permutation
network [6].
4) g1(k, x, r) – again value r would need to be in-
cluded in ciphertext generated by G but now for
an attacker this case would be no easier than when
g1 depends solely on k (just as in the case 3).
While g2 cannot remove randomness (unless F is triv-
ially broken) and the randomness used in g1 needs to
be included in the ciphertext, one needs g2 anyway. It is
required for the protection in the case when attacker has
access to the decryption oracle – then g2 plays the same
role as g1 plays for protecting against timing attacks during
encryption.
We suggest the following approach, let k = (kf , kg)
where kf is a portion of the secret key used by F :
1) Let g1(kg, x), g2(kg, x) be permutations of n = |x|
bits depending on a key. I.e., g1(kg, ·) and g2(kf , ·)
are permutations constructed based on kg and kf
respectively, which are later on applied to x, a
sequence of n bits (similarly as in McBits scheme)
2) Both g1, g2 are the permutations obtained as a result
of KSA∗∗Shuffle,ST algorithm – one has a freedom in
the choice of a shuffle algorithm.
x
g1kg
Fkf
g2kg
y
Fig. 6. Timing attack immune G obtained from timing attack susceptible
F via compounding with SST-based shuffling algorithms g1, g2.
Algorithm 8G – timing attack immune encryption based on
timing attack susceptible symmetric encryption F
Require: x, F, g1, g2, kf , kg
1: compute y1 = g1(kg, x)
2: compute y2 = F (kf , y1)
3: return y = g2(kg , y2)
Algorithm 9 G−1 – timing attack immune decryption im-
plementation based on timing attack susceptible symmetric
decryption F−1
Require: y, F−1, g−11 , g
−1
2 , kf , kg
1: compute x1 = g
−1
2 (kg, y)
2: compute x2 = F
−1(kf , x1)
3: return x = g−11 (kg, x2)
Resulting G has the following properties:
G1 Resulting permutation g1 is uniformly random,
provided a long enough kg is applied (see prop-
erty P1 from Section 5).
G2 For a given kg and for any x, x
′ one obtains
T (g1(kg, x)) = T (g1(kg , x
′)) (and the same
holds for g2) – while g1 is a result of SST,
running it for the same input kg leads to the
same running time.
G3 The running time of g1 (and of g2) does not
reveal any information about the resulting per-
mutation (see property P2). As a result, the ad-
versary does not have influence on inputs to F .
The property G3 guarantees security of the outputs of
g1 and g2 and that they cannot be derived from the running
time but it does no guarantee that kg will remain secure.
It turns out that some bits of kg may leak through the
information about the running time but:
• there are at least n! (where n is the number of bits of
x) different keys which have the same running time,
• the information which leaks from the running time
does not let to obtain ANY information about the
resulting permutation.
For more details see Section 6.5.
6.4 Implementation
To implement the above construction, one needs
(pseudo)random bits to generate a permutation g1.
These bits can be obtained in the similar way one may
produce a key for authenticated encryption: let k be a
128-bit AES key, calculate kg ← AES(k, 0), kg ← AES(k, 1),
and km ← AES(k, 2). Then AES(kg, IV ) is used as a stream
cipher to feed Riffle Shuffle until SST occurs, producing
g1. The following bits in the same way produce g2. F is
e.g.,AES-128 in CBC or CTR mode, all having kf as a secret
key. Then, km may be used to compute the MAC (this
disallows an adversary to play with e.g., hamming weight
of inputs of g1).
A proof of concept implementation was prepared (as a
student project: https://bitbucket.org/dmirecki/bearssl/).
This implementation first uses the AES key and riffle-shuffle
to generate an array (permutation) which stores the permu-
tation g1 (of size 128). Then it permutes bits of the buffer by
performing 128-step loop (line 34 of the listing 1).
Fix n = 128 = 27. Any permutation of [n] can be
represented as 7 steps of Riffle Shuffle. This can be exploited
to speed up the application of the permutation:
1) generate a permutation using Riffle Shuffle with
SST (14 steps on average), say permutation σ was
obtained.
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Listing 1 A fragment of the (src/riffle.c) responsible for
applying a shuffle.
/src/riffle.c
34 for (uint32_t i = 0; i < 128; i++) {
35 if (CHECK_BIT(buf[i >> 3], i & 7)) {
36 SET_BIT(temp_buf[permutation[i] >> 3],
37 permutation[i] & 7);
38 }
39 }
2) represent σ as 7 steps of some other Riffle Shuffle
scheme, i.e., compute the corresponding 7 · 128 bits.
Do the same for σ−1.
3) apply this 7-step Riffle Shuffle on input bits.
Then the last stepmay be implemented using efficient in-
structions: _pext_u64, _pdep_u64, _mm_popcnt_u64
or its 32-bit analogs. Consult [1] p. 4-270 – 4-273 Vol. 2B for
above instructions.
big ct student sst
AES-128 CBC encrypt 170.78 29.06 11.46 37.63
AES-128 CBC decrypt 185.23 44.28 11.48 37.65
AES-128 CTR 180.94 55.60 16.83 37.52
Fig. 7. Comparison of the efficiency of selected algorithms: big –
classic, table-based AES implementation, ct – constant time implemen-
tation using bitslicing strategy, student – implementation of the sst-
masking described in Section 6 with slow permutation application, sst
– estimated implementation which of the sst-masking which uses BMI2
and SSE4.2 instructions. All results are in MB/s and were obtained by
running speed tests of the BearSSL [25] (via the command: testspeed
all on Intel i7-4712HQ with 16GB RAM).
6.5 Timing attacks and KSA**
This section explains why bits of the secret key kg used to
generate g1, g2 need to be distinct to the bits kf which are
used by F . This is a simple conclusion of properties P1 and
P2 (defined in Section 5). The examples are intended to give
a reader a better insights on the properties achieved by SST
shuffling algorithms. As already mentioned - regardless the
duration of SST algorithm adversary can learn something
about the key, but has completely no knowledge about the
resulting permutation. The examples will also show how a
choice of a shuffling algorithm influences the leaking infor-
mation about the key. In both cases we consider extreme
(and very unlikely) situation where algorithm runs for the
smallest number of steps.
6.5.1 Top-to-random card shuffling
Consider the algorithm KSA∗∗T2R,ST with the shuffling proce-
dure corresponding to Top-To-Random card shuffling: put
the card which is currently on the top to the position j
defined by the bits of the key kg in the current round. Recall
stopping rule ST which is SST for this shuffle: stop one step
after the card which was initially at the bottom reaches the
top of the deck. Before the start of the algorithm, mark the
last card (i.e., the card n is marked1).
In Figure 8 a sample execution of the algorithm is pre-
sented (for n = 8). It is an extreme situation in which SST
1. It is known [3] that optimal SST for top to random initially marks
card which is second from the bottom.
was achieved after n steps (the lower bound for the running
time) – please keep in mind that the expected running time
of this SST is O(n log n). Based on this knowledge it is easy
to observe that there is only one possible value of kg[1] pro-
vided that SST lasted n steps – kg[1] = 111 = [8]\[7]; kg[2] is
either 110 or 111 so kg[2] ∈ [8]\ [6] and kg[i] ∈ [n]\ [n−i] for
each i = 1, . . . , n. While some information about the key kg
leaks from the fact that the SST stopped just after n steps,
still no adversary can learn anything about the resulting
permutation because every permutation is generated with
exactly the same probability.
We showed an extreme case when SST algorithm for
Top-To-Random runs the minimal number of steps n. Since
kg[i] ∈ [n] \ [n − i] for i = 1, . . . , n so the number of bits
of entropy of the secret key kg adversary learns each round
i is equal to lg i. There are n! possible keys which result in
running time n of SST. An adversary learns a fraction of n!
out of 2n lgn = nn possible keys. Moreover it can predict a
prefix of the kg with high probability.
6.5.2 Riffle Shuffle
Consider the algorithm KSA∗∗RS,ST with the shuffling proce-
dure corresponding to (time reversal of) Riffle Shuffle. Recall
the shuffling: at each step assign each card a random bit,
then put all cards with bit assigned 0 to the top keeping the
relative ordering. Sample execution is presented in Fig. 9.
Recall the construction of SST for this example:
Consider, initially unmarked, all
(n
2
)
pairs of cards;
at each step mark pair (i, j) if cards i and j were
assigned different bits.
Assume for simplicity that n is a power of 2. How many
pairs can be marked in first step? For example, if there is
only one bit equal to 0 and all other are equal to 1, then
n − 1 pairs are marked. It is easy to see that the maximal
number of pairs will be marked if exactly half (i.e., n2 ) cards
were assign bit 1 and other half were assign bit 0. Then
n2
4 pairs will be marked (all pairs of form (i, j): i < j and
cards i and j were assigned different bits). After such a step
there will be two groups of cards: the ones assigned 0 and
ones assigned 1. All pairs of cards within each group are
not marked. Then again, to mark as many pairs as possible
exactly half of the cards in each group must be assigned bit
0 and other half bit 1 – then n
2
8 new pairs will be marked.
Iterating this procedure, we see that the shortest execution
takes lg n steps after which all
n2
4
+
n2
8
+
n2
16
+ . . .+
n2
21+lgn
=
(
n
2
)
pairs are marked. In Figure 9 such sample execution is
presented. There are exactly n! keys resulting in lg n steps
of SST (each resulting in different permutation). Thus the
adversary learns a tiny fraction of possible keys: n! out of
2n lgn = nn.
6.5.3 Summary
As we have seen the choice of shuffle algorithm matters for
KSA∗∗. In any case the resulting permutation is not revealed
at all, but some knowledge on key can be obtained. In both
presented examples an adversary who observed that the
time to generate a permutation was minimal (for a given
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3
Fig. 8. Example run of top-to-random shuffle taken from the key kg of the length equal to 8 8-value bytes (24-bits). Conditioning on the number of
steps of the SST (in this case 8) one can find out that: out of the possible 224 keys only (exactly) 8! keys are possible (due to the fact that SST
stopped exactly after 8 steps) and every of 8! permutations is possible – moreover each permutation with exactly the same probability. SST leaks
bits of the key i.e., kg[1] = 111 but does not leak any information about the produced permutation.
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Fig. 9. Example run of (time reversal of) Riffle Shuffle of n = 8 cards and key kg = [00001111, 00110011, 01010101, . . .]. At each step the left
column represents current permutation, whereas the right one currently assigned bits. See description in the text.
SST) learns that one out of n! keys was used (out of nn
possible keys). However there is a huge difference between
these two shuffling schemes:
• in Riffle Shuffle an adversary learns that in the first
step one key out of
( n
n/2
)
possible keys (leading to
the shortest running time) was used. For the second
step there are exactly
(n/2
n/4
)2
for each choice of the
key made in the fist step, and similarly for the next
steps. This makes recovering any information about
the key used infeasible.
• in Top-To-Random the situation of an adversary is
quite different. It gets all lgn bits of the key used
in the first step of the algorithm (provided the al-
gorithm run for n steps). In the ith round it gets
information about lg n− i+ 1 bits.
Recall that these were the extreme and very unlikely cases.
In both cases the probability of the shortest run is equal to
n!/nn (= 7.29× 10−55 for n = 128).
Another advantage of Riffle Shuffle is that on average
the number of required bits is equal to 2n lgn which is
only 2 times more than the minimal number of bits (as
presented in the example). For Top-To-Random on average
the number of bits required is equal to n logn lgn which
is logn times larger than the minimal number of bits.
This follows from the fact that the variance of SST for
Riffle Shuffle is much smaller than the variance for Top-
To-Random. Smaller variance means that fewer information
can be gained from the running time. While the expected
number of bits required by KSA∗∗ may seem to be high, for
the post-quantum algorithms like McBits it is not an issue –
McBits requires keys of size 216−220 bytes, Top-To-Random
needs around 12,000 bits and Riffle Shuffle needs on average
4096 bits to generate a uniform permutation for n = 256.
It is also worth mentioning that in real-life systems
we could artificially additionally mask the duration of the
algorithm: If we know values of ET for given SST we
can run it always for at least ET steps (similarly, to avoid
extremely long execution we can let at most ET + c · V arT
steps provided V arT is known).
7 CONCLUSIONS
We presented the benefits of using Strong Stationary Times
in cryptographic schemes (pseudo random permutation
generators). These algorithms have a “health-check” built-in
and guarantee the best possible properties (when it comes
to the quality of randomness of the resulting permutation).
We showed how SST algorithms may be used to con-
struct timing attack immune implementations out of timing
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attack susceptible ones. The SST-based masking leads to
comparable (to constant-time implementation) slow-down
(but it is platform independent), see Figure 7 for efficiency
comparison.
We showed that algorithms using SST achieve better se-
curity guarantees than any algorithmwhich runs predefined
number of steps.
We also proved a better bound for the mixing-time of the
Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions shuffling process which
is used in RC4 and showed that different, more efficient
shuffling methods (i.e., time reversal of Riffle Shuffle) may
be used as KSA. This last observation shows that the gap be-
tween mathematical model (4096 bits required) and reality
(2048 allowed as maximum length of RC4) is not that big as
previously thought (bound of 23 037 by Mironov [21]).
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